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INTRODUCTION

Reid Weisbord and David Horton have undertaken an incredibly
important empirical study in an area of law that suffers from a large gap in
our understanding of how people actually choose to leave their property at
their death and the drafting traps that can easily lead to litigation. The study
is also important for illustrating how the lawyers we teach in Trusts and Estates
need to be more careful in drafting the various documents to manifest their
clients’ testamentary intent. In particular, Weisbord and Horton studied 230
recently probated wills in Sussex County, New Jersey and discovered that the
use of boilerplate language in certain key provisions can have troubling
consequences for the testators and their beneficiaries. 1 In examining these
wills, Weisbord and Horton discovered that there was a consistent use of
boilerplate language in four provisions: (1) the just debts clause; (2) the tax
apportionment clause; (3) the method of representation for class gifts; and
(4) the survivorship language necessary to defeat application of anti-lapse
*

Clarence J. TeSelle Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law.
1. Reid Kress Weisbord & David Horton, Boilerplate and Default Rules in Wills Law: An
Empirical Analysis, 103 Iowa L. Rev. 663, 668 (2018).
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statutes. 2 After examining the implications of the use of boilerplate in these
four provisions, Weisbord and Horton argue that probate laws should make
the default rules “stickier” so that it is more difficult for testators, or their
attorneys, to draft around the defaults. 3 This was especially true in situations
where bad drafting often led to litigation. 4
I found their data and arguments compelling and vital to a
comprehensive understanding of how probate laws, probate lawyers, testators,
and beneficiaries all interact in the effectuation of testamentary documents.
In my brief commentary, I will discuss each of these four provisions (somewhat
out of order) and offer additional thoughts and observations that may inform
future research in this area.
II.

JUST DEBTS

The first boilerplate provision is the just debts clause. This is a clause
lawyers inserted into wills in 96% of cases, despite the fact that it is legally
unnecessary and often offers absolutely no guidance when there actually are
ambiguities as to which debts a decedent intended to have paid. 5 As Weisbord
and Horton conclude, “most lawyers clung to generic ‘just debts’ language,
even though it is pure risk with no corresponding benefit.” 6 Because the
executor is required to pay a decedent’s debts regardless of the presence of a
just debts clause, a well-phrased and intentional clause could be used to clarify
which debts should take priority if a decedent has more debts than are assets
in his estate, and it could help with the second provision, the testator’s
intentions regarding payment of estate taxes. In most cases, however, the just
debts clause offered no guidance where it was really needed, and at times it
even spurred litigation. 7
There are likely to be numerous reasons lawyers include a bland,
unhelpful “just debts” provision. One is custom. 8 Like reciting that the
testator is of sound mind and over age 18, the “just debts” clause sets the mood
for the rest of the will. It also indicates that the testator is morally responsible,
and it expressly indicates the intention of paying off any debts he or she has
assumed during life. There is something worthy about acknowledging one’s
debts, for it also indicates that the testator understands that the debts come
before any bequests, and the testator is warning the beneficiaries that they
stand second to creditors. 9
2. Id. at 676–82.
3. Id.
4. See id. at 688.
5. Id. at 698.
6. Id.
7. See id. at 680, 698 (noting that 96% of wills had a “just debts” clause and 71% were generic,
offering no guidance).
8. Id. at 679.
9. Id. at 695–98.
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However, the fact that lawyers tend to use standard boilerplate that does
not elucidate what priority should be given to certain debts over others, that
often does not clarify how taxes are to be apportioned, and that can muddy
an otherwise unambiguous will is problematic at best and malpractice at worst.
Weisbord and Horton suggest that changes to probate law should make the
default of non-exoneration stickier, so that any debts attached to certain
property (like a mortgage, a car loan, and the like) would not be paid by the
estate and the beneficiary would take the property subject to the debt unless
the testator was absolutely clear that the debt would be paid by the estate. 10 In
other words, Weisbord and Horton suggest that a boilerplate just debts clause
be given no meaning, and that the default rule of non-exoneration would
operate regardless. I very much liked the suggestion that boilerplate just debts
clauses be given no meaning with regard to exoneration unless the testator
expressly identifies the debts to be paid. One problem with such a suggestion,
however, is that very often a will is written years before the decedent’s death,11
and the decedent may not know what debts he or she will have and how those
debts may affect the overall estate plan. An alternative that might make more
sense would be that, rather than expressly listing the items of property which
are to pass debt-free, the testator identify which beneficiaries should be given
property debt-free. Because most testators use their residuary clause to benefit
their primary beneficiaries 12—like spouses and children—identifying up
front which beneficiaries are privileged means the testator can identify which
class of gifts will ultimately end up paying for any debts that are exonerated
without having to list the property, list the debts, or even know what property
or what debts the testator will have at death.
I think if we were to ask testators explicit questions about exoneration,
we would be likely to find that their desires are more nuanced than simply
whether they want to exonerate or not. Making it harder for them to
exonerate does not address the likelihood that, if asked explicitly, their
answers would likely be yes for some and no for others, or yes under certain
circumstances and no under others. In other words, only if they knew how
much debt they were likely to have, how much wealth would be available, and
who their surviving beneficiaries are, could they answer that question
relatively accurately. To add a certain amount of nuance without requiring
explicit language in a will, the law could be changed to distinguish between
privileged and non-privileged beneficiaries, just as the Uniform Probate Code

10. Id. at 705.
11. In my own research into hundreds of wills probated in Alachua County, Florida in 2013,
I found that nearly 60% of wills were executed more than five years before death. Research on
file with author.
12. See Marc S. Bekerman, Navigating a Non-Tax Estate Planning Maze with Some Tax
Considerations, 27 PROB. & PROP. 9, 13 (2013) (“Apportioning estate taxes against residuary
bequests will reduce the amounts passing to those beneficiaries who are usually the beneficiaries
that the client intends to benefit the most.”).
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does with anti-lapse. 13 The law could provide that spouses and perhaps
children receive property free of debts, but others do not, unless expressly
stated otherwise.
Thus, rather than the current plan, which usually ends up requiring that
the residuary beneficiaries pay any debts for property being specifically
devised, 14 the testator could instead state that debts should be paid on all gifts
to privileged beneficiaries, or should not be paid on gifts to beneficiaries who
are not related by blood or marriage. This is just one suggestion that might
help testators who, at the time of drafting their will, assume their estates will
have sufficient assets to pay off all debts and thus who make generous bequests
and perhaps even include a direction in their just debts clause to pay all debts,
but whose estates are less flush after end-of-life medical expenses are paid.
Of course, Weisbord and Horton’s proposal to make non-exoneration
stickier has the benefit of continuing to operate as a default rule or, as they
note, a majoritarian principle. 15 Thus, Weisbord and Horton’s proposal is a
change in law that will hopefully spur a change in practice. My
recommendation is the change in practice. Asking testators to identify
privileged classes of beneficiaries requires that they be explicit, which is
precisely what they would need to do to override sticky defaults, but in a way
that they may be better able to accommodate the information gap caused by
the time lag. Making the defaults stickier will hopefully spur more intentioned
drafting, but if that fails, we could adopt a default that attempts to deal in a
more nuanced way with the information gap between will execution and
death.
As with any default rule, there will be situations where exoneration or
non-exoneration fails to correspond to testamentary intent. But perhaps a
change in the law will spur estate planning lawyers into asking their clients
directly about whether debts should be paid. This is a particularly important
issue because most people will acquire significant health-care debts for their
end-of-life care and are unlikely to properly anticipate the effect of those debts
on their estates. Getting estate-planning lawyers to be more intentional in
thinking about end-of-life debts would be one benefit of creating a sticky
default that distinguishes between certain classes of beneficiaries.
III.

TAX APPORTIONMENT

The tax apportionment boilerplate is perhaps even more problematic
than the just debts clause because standard boilerplate that instructs the
executor to pay the estate taxes from the residuary can have tremendous tax
13. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603(b) (2010) (applying only to devisees who are either
a grandparent, or a descendant of a grandparent—thus excluding friends, distant relatives,
and neighbors).
14. Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Dan T. Hastings, The Tax Apportionment Clause – Often the Most
Important Provision in the Will, 60 N.Y. ST. B.J. 26, 27 (1988).
15. Weisbord & Horton, supra note 1, at 668.
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consequences. As the famous In re Estate of Kuralt case shows, boilerplate can
be more than simply superfluous, and indeed quite consequential. 16 However,
if this were simply a problem with estates that run into federal estate taxes, I
frankly would be less concerned. Those estates are well over $5 million and
comprise less than 0.2% of all estates. 17 Such an estate is almost guaranteed
to have had competent estate planning lawyers drafting the various succession
documents and their failure to properly attribute the taxes should comprise
malpractice. And is quite likely that malpractice actions will have better results
in getting lawyers to pay attention to the problems with boilerplate than
making the apportionment default stickier. Nonetheless, with state estate and
inheritance taxes kicking in at a much lower threshold, the malpractice of the
smaller estates’ attorneys can be particularly troubling. Thus, this is an issue
that faces far more estates than one might initially surmise.
The question I have, however, is whether making the clause stickier will
actually lead to better results. Particularly, will lawyers drafting wills actually
anticipate the problems that can arise with mal-apportionment of taxes if they
draft thinking that, by paying the taxes out of the provisions for the spouse,
the decedent will not have any taxes? In other words, will estates lawyers
actually get it right if they have to be more intentional when they opt out of
the default, or will they simply use more explicit language to opt out thinking
they are doing the right thing, when in fact they are not?
I would assume that every estates lawyer is now familiar with the Kuralt
case and will think twice before including boilerplate tax apportionment
language to pay from the residuary. But assuming that is not the case, what is
the best way to get that lawyer to do it right? As with the just debts clause, it
may make more sense for the lawyer drafting a will to privilege certain
beneficiaries rather than assume he or she knows in advance what the tax
consequences of the estate plan will be or that assigning taxes to the residuary
will result in the optimal tax outcome. Of course, the point of the default rule
is that apportionment to all property makes more sense than the residuary
paying when the latter is going to result in more taxes. But it is the opposite
when paying from the residuary would result in fewer taxes. But again,
assuming a decedent and her lawyer are talking about taxes in the client
meetings, my guess is that more decedents would prefer to privilege certain
beneficiaries rather than identify a particular pot of assets from which to pay
tax debts—especially when testators are unlikely to know exactly how many
assets and in what form they will take many years in the future when the
testator passes into that dark night. Thus, the identity of privileged
beneficiaries is likely to be more consistent over time than the nature and

16. In re Estate of Kuralt, 68 P.3d 662, 664–68 (Mont. 2003).
17. See Patricia Cohen, Who’d Gain From an Estate Tax Rollback: The 0.2 Percenters, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/business/economy/estate-tax.html; Estate
Tax, IRS (May 9, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/estate-tax.
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identity of property. Moreover, privileged beneficiaries are more likely to
remain constant than the changing tax code.
Both of these boilerplate issues force us to ask whether a testator who is
expressly asked about exoneration or tax apportionment at the time of will
drafting, presumably with good legal advice, is more likely to plan for the
optimal outcome than a default rule, sticky or otherwise. In other words,
assuming there is an optimal exoneration or tax apportionment outcome for
every estate, and that testators are asked about each and identify their
preferences at the time they draft their wills, are they more likely to reach
their optimal outcome if they are asked explicitly and their preferences are
incorporated into their wills, or are the odds just as likely that a default rule
will result in the optimal outcome years later when they die and the
documents take effect? Given the uncertainty of assets and priorities at the
moment of death, a point sometimes far in the future, it may be that the
defaults are likely to result in better outcomes than expressing some intention
that may exist when the will is drafted but not when the will becomes effective.
If the uncertainty of assets and priorities in the future actually results in nonoptimal outcomes for those decedents who intentionally plan, then it makes
sense to calibrate the default more accurately rather than push lawyers into
drafting more intentionally. And again, I would argue that testators are more
likely to remain fixed on who their privileged beneficiaries are than on the
identity of their assets at death. If that is the case—and intentional planning
is either ineffective, ill-advised, or simply boilerplate—then making the
defaults stickier and more nuanced by providing privileged classes of
beneficiaries might be even more in line with testamentary intent than simply
making the defaults stickier.
IV.

REPRESENTATION LANGUAGE

The third boilerplate provision Weisbord and Horton identify is the
misuse of representation language. 18 This is one of those puzzles that always
stuns me. Although we spend one to two days in an average trusts and estates
class on the different representation schemes, it is not a very difficult concept.
If students learn anything, it should be that the different representational
schemes clearly apply only to gifts to multi-generational classes, not gifts to
individuals. And yet nearly 20% of Weisbord and Horton’s wills used the term
completely inaccurately. 19 I frankly do not know what to think about this, and
it is a problem that I have encountered routinely in teaching future interests
and trust drafting, where the cases show testators and their lawyers have
absolutely no idea what the terms per stirpes and per capita mean. On the one
hand, I would not be too concerned about it when we realize that getting it

18. Weisbord & Horton, supra note 1, at 692.
19. Weisbord & Horton, supra note 1, at 694 (finding that 48 out of 260 wills used representation
language for individuals).
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wrong may simply mean that grandchildren or lineal descendants may take
uneven shares when they were supposed to get even shares, or vice versa; they
still take shares nonetheless. What makes the inaccuracy problematic,
however, is when the term is misapplied to a gift to an individual, and then a
court interprets the term to indicate intent to apply an anti-lapse statute in
the absence of a qualifying relationship. When ignorance of a term’s
meaning, which is apparent from the way these particular terms are misused,
has distributive consequences such that some unintended people may take a
gift and the intended beneficiaries do not, the problem needs to be
addressed. If it were just a matter of the percentage of the bequest that each
intended beneficiary receives, the problem would not be so bad. Yet I have to
ask whether making the default stickier will ultimately help. To the extent the
anti-lapse boilerplate issue is the real problem, then perhaps there is nothing
one can do about the utter ignorance of testators and attorneys who misuse
the representational language. We can focus on fixing the anti-lapse issue and
hope that that 20% number falls as a result.
But I am not entirely happy with that. Part of the problem stems from the
fact that we actually have different representational schemes, and not just per
stirpes and per capita. Some states have a hybrid form that is per capita at certain
levels and per stirpes at others. 20 And of course others use a degree-ofrelationship scheme rather than the more standard parentelic scheme. 21 One
obvious solution would be to standardize the representational scheme across
the states, which is what the Uniform Probate Code is attempting to do. 22 But
unfortunately, the per stirpes model has been difficult to displace, in large part
because beneficiaries think it is more fair. There is something intrinsically
equitable about dividing class gifts initially at the first level of children.
One option would be to simply provide that all class gifts will conform to
a particular representational scheme and not allow deviation except by
individual gifts directly to the beneficiaries. Another would be to ignore all
references to per stirpes or per capita unless the term is used correctly, thus not
allowing it to trigger any anti-lapse provision. Another would be to abolish
both and require that testators expressly identify how they want class gifts to
be distributed. None of these options is likely to be satisfactory, but we can
analogize the situation to the fate of adopted children and the gradual
displacement of the stranger to the adoption rule.

20. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-42 (2018) (stating Alabama uses per capita with representation);
IDAHO CODE § 15–2–106 (West 2018). And Pennsylvania has a per capita with representation
scheme, but has a degree of relationship exception. See 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2104
(West 2018).
21. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-1 (West 2018); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 888, 892, and
896 (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 190B § 2-103(4) (West 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 314(b)(4) (West 2018). Louisiana, Massachusetts, and Vermont use representation at the
closest levels and then a degree of relationship scheme for more distant and collateral relatives.
22. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-103 and comment (amended 2010).
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In all states at one time or other, adopted children were not treated as
natural children until state statutes were modified to treat them the same. 23
There was also the ubiquitous stranger to the adoption rule that did not
include adopted children in class gifts by donors who were not the adoptive
parent. 24 Yet today, it is very unusual to see a provision in a will that excludes
an adopted child. 25 The new rule eventually took hold and operates nearly
universally. 26 Of course, until the per capita scheme was adopted, per stirpes
had a stranglehold in most probate codes, which meant that at least there was
not a lot of unintended deviation even if the term was used for individual
gifts. 27 So the question is whether we should simply mandate a particular rule,
like the adoption rule, and over time assume it will become nearly universally
followed; or do we try to encourage donors to pick and choose, assuming that
the smorgasbord option will result in greater satisfaction of testamentary
intent? I do not know what the best solution would be, but certainly untying
misapplication of representation language from anti-lapse would be a start in
the right direction.
V.

SURVIVORSHIP LANGUAGE AND ANTI-LAPSE

The fourth provision is the survivorship language used to indicate intent
not to apply anti-lapse protections to certain gifts. Although the Uniform
Probate Code has tried to make this default rule stickier, most states have
opted against doing so. 28 That suggests that legislators, and the trusts and
estates bar that advises them, have some intentional basis for rejecting the
basic rule that mere survivorship language alone does not indicate intent not
to apply the anti-lapse protections. This dispute reminds me of many age-old
property law problems, where the courts have to grapple with silence and
impose meaning when the documents are either silent or ambiguous. In this
case, where a testator fails to state specifically where each bequest will go in
case any beneficiary predeceases her, there is no reason to assume silence
means an unreasonable outcome, whether that outcome is lapse or no lapse.
Lawyers certainly need to discuss with their clients the implications of lapse
and anti-lapse protections and need to provide for every alternative if they
want to avoid application of anti-lapse.
23. See generally W.W. Allen, Right of Adopted Child to Inherit from Kindred of Adoptive Parent, 43
A.L.R.2d 1183 (1955) (explaining the history of inheritance for adopted children).
24. Hallie E. Still-Caris, Legislative Reform: Redefining the Parent-Child Relationship in Cases of
Adoption, 71 IOWA L. REV. 265, 284–87 (1985).
25. Mark Strasser, Interstate Recognition of Adoptions: On Jurisdiction, Full Faith and Credit, and
the Kinds of Challenges the Future May Bring, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1809, 1830–31.
26. Id.
27. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, A Proposed Alternative to the Uniform Probate Code’s System for
Intestate Distribution Among Descendants, 66 NW. U. L. REV. 626, 628 (1971).
28. The Uniform Probate Code’s recommended anti-lapse provision, § 2-603, adopts a sticky
default regarding words of survivorship that has not been adopted by most states. See also UNIF. PROB.
CODE § 2-603 cmt. “Contrary Intention—the Rationale of Subsection (b)(3) (amended 2010).

WRIGHT_PP_MOELLER (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

11/12/2018 12:51 PM

COMMENTARY ON WEISBERG AND HORTON

131

Perhaps the problem is with the lapse rule itself. If there were no lapse
rule, there would be no need for anti-lapse statutes. If all gifts went to lineal
descendants of pre-deceased beneficiaries, there would be no need to draft
complicated survivorship options. If there were not complicated rules about
anti-lapse application, then the misuse of representational language would
have little effect.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Thus, while I agree wholeheartedly with Weisbord and Horton about the
problems of these four boilerplate provisions, I wonder if simply making the
defaults stickier is adequate. I suspect it would be adequate for the tax
apportionment boilerplate because most lawyers drafting wills and trusts for
high-value estates are likely to understand the consequences of getting it
wrong. I do not think the problems we see with representational language,
however, can be solved as easily. The misuse of the representational language
clearly shows either ignorance on the part of a certain group of lawyers, or
that a homemade will is being used. In the case of the latter, courts are simply
going to have to grapple with the meaning of the mistaken use of
representational language because making the default stickier is not likely to
solve the problem. And with the ignorant lawyer, the solution seems to be
better education rather than a stickier default. The just debts and anti-lapse
problems lie somewhere in between. Clearly there is ignorance or laziness on
the part of some lawyers, and in many cases the consequences are not terrible,
so there is no incentive for them to improve. The question is whether
improvement will come with better education, more severe consequences like
malpractice exposure, or stickier defaults. The stickier default option is
probably the least costly, but it also raises the moral hazard of not punishing
those who continue to act irresponsibly. I wonder if that is the direction we
want to pursue, given the finality of the decisions in this area of law. If higher
taxes are paid, or an anti-lapse provision is, or is not, applied, there can be
profound consequences for the living. Estates can be ruined, family harmony
destroyed, and lawyers can lose their reputations. I have fewer qualms about
boilerplate that has fewer consequences than boilerplate that results in
bequests passing to the wrong people, or higher taxes being paid, or litigation
becoming necessary. The harm the Kuralt case imposed on the decedent’s
wife and children is inestimable; it cannot be made up simply by winning
damages in a malpractice action.
Weisbord and Horton’s article is incredibly valuable because it shows not
just the understandable places where ambiguities lie and traps that can catch
the unwary estate planning lawyer. Rather, it shows the inexcusable errors, the
ambiguities that are inserted because of laziness or ignorance, and the
barriers to attempts to provide better default rules. In an ideal world, would
we change the rules, make the defaults stickier, jettison the rules, or mandate
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no deviation? Those are questions none of us can answer, but Weisbord and
Horton’s article should get us thinking about them.

